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I. Introduction
Since 1990, three different U.S. Presidents have accused Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of committing grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and acts of genocide.' Although the Geneva Conventions and the
Genocide Convention require state parties to bring offenders to justice, on the
eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush offered to call off
the attack if Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants would agree to relinquish
power and go into exile.2 This was no publicity stunt, as some have
characterized it. Working through President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the
United States actively pursued the matter with several Mideast countries,
ultimately persuading Bahrain to agree to provide sanctuary to Hussein if he
accepted the deal.3 When Hussein rejected the proposal, Bush promised that
the Iraqi leader would be forced from power and prosecuted as a war criminal.4
Admittedly, thousands of lives could have been spared if Hussein had
accepted the deal. But at the risk of being accused of blindly embracing Kant's
prescription that "justice must be done even should the heavens fall, ''5 this
1. See Michael P. Scharf, Don't Just Fight Him, Indict Him, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6,2002, at
M1 (recounting Hussein regime's atrocities); Michael P. Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair
Trial? WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2004, at BI ("[T]here is a mountain of evidence of atrocities
committed by Hussein's regime."). On July 1,2004, Saddam Hussein was arraigned before the
Iraqi Special Tribunal, and informed that he was charged with (1) the systematic killing of
religious figures in 1974, which constituted a crime against humanity; (2) killing off the Kurdish
Barzani clan in 1983, which constituted genocide; (3) torturing and killing members of political
parties over the last thirty years, which constituted a crime against humanity; (4) using chemical
weapons against the Kurds in Halabja in 1988, which constituted a crime against humanity;
(5) the "Anfal" ethnic cleansing campaign against Kurds in 1987-88, which constituted
genocide; (6) war crimes during the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which constituted grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions; and (7) the drying up of rivers, killing hundreds of thousands of
Marsh Arabs in response to their 1991 uprising, which constituted genocide. Charges Facing
Saddam Hussein, BBC NEWS, July 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3320293.
stm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
2. See Julian Borger, Diplomacy Dies, Now It's War: Bush Gives Saddam and His Sons
48 Hours to Leave Iraq or Face Massive Military Onslaught, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 18,
2003, at 1 (describing President Bush's exile offer).
3. Emily Wax, Arab Leaders Fail in Last Minute Efforts: Mubarak Blames Iraq,
Cautions Coalition: Bahrain Signals that it Would Give Hussein Sanctuary, WASH. POST, Mar.
20, 2003, at A21.
4. Richard W. Stevenson, Threats and Responses: The President; Bush Gives Hussein
48 Hours, and Vows to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at 1.
5. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OFMORALS 141 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge
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Article argues that it was inappropriate for the Bush Administration even to
make the offer, and that if implemented the exile-for-peace deal would have
seriously undermined the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention,
which require prosecution of alleged offenders without exception.
A few months after the invasion of Iraq, U.S. officials helped broker a deal
whereby Liberian President Charles Taylor, who had been indicted for crimes
against humanity by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, agreed to give up
power and was allowed to flee to Nigeria, where he received asylum.6 At the
time, forces opposed to Taylor, which had taken over most of the country, were
on the verge of attacking the capital city Monrovia, and tens of thousands of
civilian casualties were forecast. The exile deal averted the crisis and set the
stage for insertion of a U.N. peacekeeping mission that stabilized the country
and set it on a path to peace and democracy.7 In contrast to the Hussein case,
the Taylor arrangement did not in any way violate international law. This
Article explains why international law should treat the two situations
differently, prohibiting exile and asylum for Saddam Hussein while permitting
such a justice-for-peace exchange in the case of Charles Taylor.
This is the first scholarly article in recent years to focus on the significant
issue of exile. Scholarship on the analogous issue of amnesty has been written
largely from the point of view of aggressive advocates of international justice,
whose writing is based on the assumption that the widespread state practice
favoring amnesties constitutes a violation of, rather than a reflection of,
international law in this area.8 Before analyzing the relevant legal principles,
1991) (1785).
6. Ryan Lizza, Charles at Large, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 2005, at 10.
7. Id.
8. See M. CHERiFBASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONALLAW, 492,
500-01 (1992) (arguing that there is an international duty to prosecute or extradite those who
commit crimes against humanity); Leila Nadya Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction, National
Amnesties, and Truth Commissions: Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-201 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2003) (arguing that amnesties create a
"culture of impunity" incompatible with international justice); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63,
63 (1996) (arguing that states have an obligation to prosecute jus cogens crimes); Carla
Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 14 (1994)
(noting U.N.'s affirmation of duty to prosecute war crimes); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling
Account: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537, 2585, 2593 (1991) (explaining that analysts interpret law generated by the Nuremberg
trials, and U.N. actions ratifying that law, to "require punishment of crimes against humanity");
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights
Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 451, 461 (1990) (urging the necessity of an
international duty to investigate grave human violations).
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the Article begins with an examination of the practical considerations that
counsel for and against the practice of "trading justice for peace." Next, using
the Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor cases as a focal point, the Article
analyzes the relevant international instruments which require prosecution under
limited circumstances. This is followed by a critique of the popular view that
customary international law and the principle of jus cogens broadly prohibit
actions that prevent prosecution of crimes under international law. The Article
establishes that there does not yet exist a customary international law rule
requiring prosecution of war crimes in internal armed conflict or crimes against
humanity, but that there is a duty to prosecute in the case of grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide, and torture. Where the duty to
prosecute does apply, it is important that states and international organizations
honor it, lest they signal disrespect for the important treaties from which the
duty arises, potentially putting their own citizens at risk and generally
undermining the rule of law.
II. Practical Considerations
A. Interests Favoring Exile, Asylum, and Amnesty
Notwithstanding the popular catch phrase of the 1990s-"no peace
without justice"-achieving peace and obtaining justice are sometimes
incompatible goals-at least in the short term. In order to end an international
or internal conflict, negotiations often must be held with the very leaders who
are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. When this is the
case, insisting on criminal prosecutions can prolong the conflict, resulting in
more deaths, destruction, and human suffering.
9
Reflecting this reality, during the past thirty years, Angola, Argentina,
Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory
Coast, Nicaragua, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uruguay have
each, as part of a peace arrangement, granted amnesty to members of the former
regime that committed international crimes within their respective borders.'0
9. As an anonymous government official stated in an oft-quoted article: "The quest for
justice for yesterday's victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes
today's living the dead of tomorrow." Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18
HuM. RTs. Q. 249, 258 (1996).
10. See Steven Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International
Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707,722-23 (1999) (mentioning the governments in transitional democracies
that have passed amnesty laws); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 8, at 461 (noting grants of amnesty in
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador); Michael P. Scharf, The Letter of the
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With respect to five of these countries-Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Sierra
Leone, and South Africa-"the United Nations itself pushed for, helped
negotiate, or endorsed the granting of amnesty as a means of restoring peace
and democratic government.""'
In addition to amnesty (which immunizes the perpetrator from domestic
prosecution), exile and asylum in a foreign country (which puts the perpetrator
out of the jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution)' 2 is often used to induce
regime change, with the blessing and involvement of significant states and the
United Nations. Peace negotiators call this the "Napoleonic Option," in
reference to the treatment of French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte who, after
his defeat at Waterloo in 1815, was exiled to St. Helena rather than face trial or
execution.13 More recently, a number of dictators have been granted sanctuary
abroad in return for relinquishing power. Thus, for example, Ferdinand Marcos
fled the Philippines for Hawaii; Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti for France;
Mengisthu Haile Miriam fled Ethiopia for Zimbabwe; Idi Amin fled Uganda
for Saudi Arabia; General Raoul Cedras fled Haiti for Panama; and Charles
Taylor fled Liberia for exile in Nigeria-a deal negotiated by the United States
and U.N. envoy Jacques Klein.
14
As Payam Akhavan, then Legal Adviser to the Office of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, observed a
decade ago: "[I]t is not unusual in the political stage to see the metamorphosis
of yesterday's war monger into today's peace broker."' 5 This is because, unless
the international community is willing to use force to topple a rogue regime,
cooperation of the leaders is needed to bring about peaceful regime change and
put an end to violations of international humanitarian law. Yet, it is not
realistic to expect them to agree to a peace settlement if, directly following the
Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 41 (1996) (discussing these countries' amnesty programs).
11. Scharf, supra note 10, at 41.
12. In cases of exile, the state where the offense occurred (the territorial state) cannot
commence proceedings as it does not have physical custody over the accused, and the sanctuary
state is generally prevented from prosecuting or extraditing by the doctrine of head of state
immunity. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 242 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (noting that the doctrine "protects all acts
which the head of state has performed in the exercise of the functions of government").
13. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 5 (1997).
14. See Dave Gilson, The Exile Files, 2003 (Aug. 21, 2003), http://www.global
policy.org/intljusticelgeneral/2003/0826exile.htm (discussing the exile arrangements of more
than a dozen individuals).
15. Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace
Agreement and Beyond, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 259, 271 (1996).
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agreement, they would find themselves or their close associates facing potential
life imprisonment.
This conclusion finds support in the observations of the 2004 Report of
the International Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone:
The Commission is unable to condemn the resort to amnesty by those
who negotiated the Lom6 Peace Agreement [which provides amnesty to
persons who committed crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone]. The
explanations given by the Government negotiators, including in their
testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are
compelling in this respect. In all good faith, they believed that the RUF
[insurgents] would not agree to end hostilities if the Agreement were not
accompanied by a form of pardon or amnesty.
The Commission is unable to declare that it considers amnesty too high
a price to pay for the delivery of peace to Sierra Leone, under the
circumstances that prevailed in July 1999. It is true that the Lom6
Agreement did not immediately return the country to peacetime. Yet it
provided the framework for a process that pacified the combatants and, five
years later, has returned Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need
not fear daily violence and atrocity.'
6
In brokering the Charles Taylor exile deal, the United States and United
Nations were particularly encouraged by the success of similar amnesty/exile
for peace arrangements relating to Haiti and South Africa in the 1990s. From
1990-1994, Haiti was ruled by a military regime headed by General Raol
Cedras and Brigadier General Philippe Biamby, which executed over 3000
civilian political opponents and tortured scores of others.' 7 The United Nations
mediated negotiations at Governors Island in New York Harbor, in which the
military leaders agreed to relinquish power and permit the return of the
democratically elected President (Jean-Bertrand Aristide) in return for a full
amnesty for the members of the regime and a lifting of the economic sanctions
imposed by the U.N. Security Council. i8 Under pressure from the United
16. 3B WITNEss TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMIssION 365 (2004), quoted in William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIs J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 145, 163-64 (2004). Schabas, the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, was a
member of the International Truth Commission for Sierra Leone.
17. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 4-5 (1996) (describing human rights
violations documented by the U.S. Department of State and various human rights groups).
18. See The Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti,
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Nations mediators, Aristide agreed to the amnesty clause of the Governors
Island Agreement. 19 The Security Council immediately "declared [its]
readiness to give the fullest possible support to the Agreement signed on
Governors Island,, 20 which it later said constitutes "the only valid framework
for the resolution of the crisis in Haiti. '' 2 1 When the military leaders initially
failed to comply with the Governors Island Agreement, on July 31, 1994, the
Security Council took the extreme step of authorizing an invasion of Haiti by a
multinational force.22 On the eve of the invasion on September 18, 1994, a deal
was struck, whereby General Cedras agreed to retire his command and accept
exile in response to a general amnesty voted into law by the Haitian parliament
and an offer by Panama to provide him asylum.
23
The amnesty deal had its desired effect: The democratically elected
Aristide was permitted to return to Haiti and reinstate a civilian government,
the military leaders left the country for sanctuary in Panama, much of the
military surrendered their arms, and most of the human rights abuses promptly
ended-all with practically no bloodshed or resistance.24  Although the
situation in Haiti has once again deteriorated, with a wave of violent protests
and strikes erupting in 2004, the more recent problems were due largely to
President Aristide's mismanagement and corruption, not the fact that the
military leaders escaped punishment ten years earlier.25
U.N. Doc. S/26063, A/47/975 (July 12, 1993) (reproducing the text of the Governors Island
Agreement). The Governors Island Agreement was supplemented by a document known as the
New York Pact, which was signed by the two sides on July 16, 1993. Paragraph 4 of the New
York Pact provides that "[t]he political forces and parliamentary blocs undertake to ensure that
the following laws are passed, on the bases of an emergency procedure: . . . (ii) Act concerning
the amnesty." The Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti
annex, 4, U.N. Doc. S/26297, A/47/1000 (Aug. 13, 1993).
19. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Haiti: Searching for Alternatives, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 188 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (describing
Aristide's opposition to granting amnesty to "common criminals" and his ultimate capitulation
in the face of tremendous pressure). Professor Stotzky of the University of Miami School of
Law served as Aristide's legal adviser while Aristide was in exile in the United States.
20. Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess. at 120, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (July 15, 1993).
21. Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3298th
mtg. at 126, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (Oct. 25, 1993).
22. S.C. Res. 940, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
23. Haitian Lawmakers Pass Partial Amnesty to Pressure Cedras, COMM. APPEAL
(Memphis), Oct. 8, 1994, at Al.
24. See Maggie O'Kane, After the Yanks Have Gone, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 18, 1995,
at 24 (describing Aristide's generally peaceful return to power).
25. International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti?, International Crisis Group
Report No. 10, 7-11 (Nov. 18, 2004).
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South Africa stands as another success story, indicating the potential value
of trading justice for peace. From 1960 to 1994, thousands of black South
Africans were persecuted and mistreated under that country's apartheid system.
With the prospect of a bloody civil war looming over negotiations, "[t]he
outgoing leaders made some form of amnesty for those responsible for the
regime a condition for the peaceful transfer to a fully democratic society.
26
The leaders of the majority black population decided that the commitment to
afford amnesty was a fair price for a relatively peaceful transition to full
democracy. 27 In accordance with the negotiated settlement between the major
parties, on July 19, 1995, the South African Parliament created a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, consisting of a Committee on Human Rights
Violations, a Committee on Amnesty, and a Committee on Reparation and
Rehabilitation.28 Under this process, amnesty would be available only to
individuals who personally applied for it and who disclosed fully the facts of
their apartheid crimes. After conducting 140 public hearings and considering
20,000 written and oral submissions, the South African Truth Commission
published a 2739-page report of its findings on October 29, 1998. 29 Most
observers believe the amnesty in South Africa headed off increasing tensions
and a potential civil war.
It is a common misconception that trading amnesty or exile for peace is
equivalent to the absence of accountability and redress.30 As in the Haitian and
South African situations described above, amnesties can be tied to
accountability mechanisms that are less invasive than domestic or international
prosecution. Ever more frequently in the aftermath of an amnesty- or exile-for-
peace deal, the concerned governments have made monetary reparations to the
victims and their families, established truth commissions to document the
abuses (and sometimes identify perpetrators by name), and have instituted
employment bans and purges (referred to as "lustration") that keep such
perpetrators from positions of public trust. 31 While not the same as criminal
26. MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 52 (1998).
27. Id. at 55.
28. National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 §§ 2, 12, 16 & 23.
29. The text of the South African Truth Commission's Report is available on the Internet
at www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc.
30. See William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International
Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 482 (2001)
(classifying amnesties into four categories, from least to most legitimate: (1) "Blanket
Amnesties"; (2) "Locally Legitimized, Partial Immunities"; (3) "Internationally Legitimized,
Partial Immunities"; and (4) "Constitutional Immunity").
31. NAoMI ROHT-ARRIAzA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 282-91(1995).
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prosecution, these mechanisms do encompass much of what justice is intended
to accomplish: prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. Indeed,
some experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute "a second
best approach" when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many situations
they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice.32
B. Factors Favoring Prosecution
Although providing amnesty and exile to perpetrators may be an effective
way to induce regime change without having to resort to force, there are several
important countervailing considerations favoring prosecution that suggest
amnesty/exile should be a bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for
extreme situations. In particular, prosecuting leaders responsible for violations
of international humanitarian law is necessary to discourage future human
rights abuses, deter vigilante justice, and reinforce respect for law and the new
democratic government.
While prosecutions might initially provoke resistance, many analysts
believe that national reconciliation cannot take place as long as justice is
foreclosed. As Professor Cherif Bassiouni, then Chairman of the U.N.
Investigative Commission for Yugoslavia, stated in 1996, "[i]f peace is not
intended to be a brief interlude between conflicts," then it must be accompanied
by justice.33
Failure to prosecute leaders responsible for human rights abuses breeds
contempt for the law and encourages future violations. The U.N. Commission
on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities have concluded that impunity is one of the main
reasons for the continuation of grave violations of human rights throughout the
world.34 Fact finding reports on Chile and El Salvador indicate that the
granting of amnesty or de facto impunity has led to an increase in abuses in
those countries.
32. See MINow, supra note 26, at 9 (contending that prosecutions "are slow, partial, and
narrow").
33. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 13 (1996).
34. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Report on the Consequences of Impunity, 1 344,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13 (Jan. 24, 1990), reprinted in 3 TRANSMONAL JUSTICE: How
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON wITH FORMER REGIMES 18, 19 (N. Kritz ed., 1995).
35. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Protection of Human Rights in Chile, 341,
U.N. Doc. A/38/385 (Oct. 17, 1983).
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Further, history teaches that former leaders given amnesty or exile are
prone to recidivism, resorting to corruption and violence and becoming a
disruptive influence on the peace process. From his seaside villa in Calabar,
Nigeria, for example, Charles Taylor orchestrated a failed assassination plot in
2005 against President Lansana Conte of Guinea, a neighboring country that
had backed the rebel movement that forced Taylor from power.
36
What a new or reinstated democracy needs most is legitimacy, which
requires a fair, credible, and transparent account of what took place and who
was responsible. Criminal trials (especially those involving proof of
widespread and systematic abuses) can generate a comprehensive record of the
nature and extent of violations, how they were planned and executed, the fate
of individual victims, who gave the orders, and who carried them out. While
there are various means to develop the historic record of such abuses, the most
authoritative rendering of the truth is possible only through the crucible of a
trial that accords full due process. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, underscored the logic of this proposition when
he reported that the most important legacy of the Nuremberg trials was the
documentation of Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in such detail that
there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future. 3 7 According
to Jackson, the establishment of an authoritative record of abuses that would
endure the test of time and withstand the challenge of revisionism required
proof of "incredible events by credible evidence.
38
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. While a
state may appropriately forgive crimes against itself, such as treason or sedition,
serious crimes against persons, such as rape and murder, are an altogether
different matter. Holding the violators accountable for their acts is a moral duty
owed to the victims and their families. Prosecuting and punishing the violators
would give significance to the victims' suffering and serve as a partial remedy
for their injuries. Moreover, prosecutions help restore victims' dignity and
36. See Lizza, supra note 6, at 10 (citing an intelligence report prepared by investigators
for the Special Court for Sierra Leone). In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1532, which required all states to freeze Charles Taylor's assets in order to prevent
him from further engaging "in activities that undermine peace and stability in Liberia and the
region." S.C. Res. 1532, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1532 (Mar. 12, 2004).
37. Report from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the
Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, to the President (Oct. 7, 1946), in 20 TEMPLE L.Q. 338,343
(1946).
38. Report from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the
Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, to the President (June 7, 1945), in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 178,
184 (Supp. 1945).
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prevent private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice, would
take it into their own hands.39
While prosecution and punishment can reinforce the value of law by
displacing personal revenge, failure to punish former leaders responsible for
widespread human rights abuses encourages cynicism about the rule of law
and distrust toward the political system. To the victims of human rights
crimes, amnesty or exile represents the ultimate in hypocrisy: While they
struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are allowed to
enjoy a comfortable retirement. When those with power are seen to be above
the law, the ordinary citizen will never come to believe in the principle of the
rule of law as a fundamental necessity in a society transitioning to
democracy.
Finally, where the United Nations or major countries give their
imprimatur to an amnesty or exile deal, there is a risk that leaders in other
parts of the world will be encouraged to engage in gross abuses. For
example, history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish
officials responsible for the massacre of over one million Armenians during
World War I encouraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude
that Germany could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity. In a 1939
speech to his reluctant General Staff, Hitler remarked, "Who after all is today
speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?" 4 Richard Goldstone, the
former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, has concluded that "the failure of the international community to
prosecute Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein and Mohammed Aidid, among
others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing in the
former Yugoslavia with the expectation that they would not be held
accountable for their international crimes., 41  When the international
community encourages or endorses an amnesty or exile deal, it sends a signal
to other rogue regimes that they have nothing to lose by instituting repressive
measures; if things start going badly, they can always bargain away their
responsibility for crimes by agreeing to peace.
39. Haitian citizens, for example, have committed acts of violence against the former
members of the brutal military regime who were given amnesty for their abuses. Gary Borg,
Former Haitian General is Gunned Down in Street, Cn. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1995, at 4.
40. Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals (Aug. 22,
1939), quoted in M. CHERiF BASSiOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANrrY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 176 n.96 (1992).
41. Michael Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DuKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 398 n.128 (1997).
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IlI. The Limited International Legal Obligation to Prosecute
In a few narrowly defined situations (described below) there is an
international legal obligation to prosecute regardless of the underlying practical
considerations. Where this is the case, failure to prosecute can amount to an
international breach. An amnesty or asylum given to the members of the
former regime could be invalidated in a proceeding before either the state's
domestic courts42 or an international forum. 43 International support for such an
amnesty or asylum deal would undermine international respect for and
adherence to the treaties that require prosecution. Finally, it would be
inappropriate for an international criminal court to defer to a national amnesty
or asylum in a situation where the amnesty or asylum violates obligations
contained in the very international conventions that make up the court's subject
matter jurisdiction.
A. Crimes Defined in International Conventions
The prerogative of states to issue an amnesty or grant asylum for an
offense can be circumscribed by treaties to which the states are party. There are
several international conventions that clearly provide for a duty to prosecute the
humanitarian or human rights crimes defined therein, including in particular the
grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,44 the Genocide
42. When the South African amnesty scheme was challenged on the grounds that it
violated the rights of families to seek judicial redress for the murders of their loved ones, the
newly created Constitutional Court rejected the claim on the ground that neither the South
African Constitution nor any applicable treaty prevented granting amnesty in exchange for truth.
See Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) 50 (S. Afr.), available
at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/2529.PDF ("[T]he epilogue to the
Constitution authorised and contemplated an 'amnesty' in its most comprehensive and generous
meaning."). A challenge to the Argentinian amnesty law fared better. In March 2001, an
Argentinian judge declared the amnesty law unconstitutional and in violation of international
law, a decision confirmed in August 2003 when Argentina's Parliament voted to annul the
amnesty law. Debora Rey, Argentina Approves Ending Laws on Amnesty, WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 2003, at A16. As this Article went to press, a lawsuit was winding its way through the
courts of Nigeria, seeking to strike down the asylum granted to Charles Taylor on the ground
that it violated Nigeria's obligations under international and domestic law to prosecute and deny
asylum to perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. James A. Goldston, Some
Quiet Victories for Human Rights, INT'L HERALD TRm., Dec. 22, 2005, at 8.
43. "Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, El Salvador, Suriname, and
Uruguay have been lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization of American States." Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2540 n.5 (1991).
44. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
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Convention,'4 and the Torture Convention.46 When these Conventions are
applicable, the granting of amnesty or asylum to persons responsible for
committing the crimes defined therein would constitute a breach of a treaty
obligation for which there can be no excuse or exception. It is noteworthy,
however, that these Conventions were negotiated in the context of the Cold
War and by design apply only to a narrow range of situations, as such
limitations were necessary to ensure widespread adoption.
1. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The four Geneva Conventions were negotiated in 1949 to codify, inter
alia, the international rules relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and
civilians during armed conflict and in occupied territory after a war. Almost
every country of the world is party to these conventions. Each of the Geneva
Conventions contains a specific enumeration of "grave breaches," which are
war crimes under international law for which there is individual criminal
liability and for which states have a corresponding duty to prosecute or
extradite. Grave breaches include willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive
destruction of property not justified by military necessity, willfully depriving a
civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial, and unlawful confinement of a
civilian.
47
Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for,
prosecute, and punish perpetrators of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, or to hand over such persons for trial by another state party. The
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
45. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IV, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
46. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 7, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 113, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1984) (entered
into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
47. Geneva Convention I, supra note 44, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 44,
art. 51; Geneva Convention m, supra note 44, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 44,
art. 147.
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339 (2006)
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, which is the official history of the
negotiations leading to the adoption of these treaties, confirms that the
obligation to prosecute grave breaches is "absolute," meaning, inter alia, that
state parties can under no circumstances grant perpetrators immunity or
amnesty from prosecution for grave breaches of the Conventions.48
It is important to recognize that while states or international tribunals may
prosecute persons who commit war crimes in internal armed conflicts, the duty
to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is limited to the
context of international armed conflict. Further, there is a high threshold of
violence necessary to constitute a genuine armed conflict, as distinct from lower
level disturbances such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of fighting, or
unilateral abuses committed by a government in the absence of widespread
armed resistance by the target population.49 Moreover, to be an international
armed conflict, the situation must constitute an armed conflict involving two or
more states, or a partial or total occupation of the territory of one state by
another.5 °
In contrast to the duty to prosecute grave breaches occurring in an
international armed conflict, with respect to internal armed conflict amnesties
are not only permitted, but are encouraged by Article 6(5) of Additional
Protocol I 51-a point the South African Constitutional Court stressed in
finding that the amnesties granted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
48. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GuIDETO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 114-15 & n.356, 341 (1995) (quoting GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED
FORCES IN THE FIELD: COMMENTARY 373, cmt. to art. 51 (J. Pictet ed., 1952)); see also THEODOR
MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 210 (1989) (noting
that the universality principle of jurisdiction, on which the grave breaches clauses of the Geneva
Conventions are based, requires states to prosecute or extradite those charged with committing
grave breaches).
49. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1(2), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (stating that the Protocol "shall
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots [and] isolated and
sporadic acts of violence"). But see Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime
Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359,365-67
(2004) (citing the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' 1997 decision in Juan Carlos
Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/IH.98,
doc. 6 rev. q]f 155-56 (1997), and the United States response to the 9/11 attacks as
developments that have sought to lower the armed conflict threshold).
50. Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, supra note 44, art. 2.
51. Additional Protocol H, supra note 49, art. 6(5) ("At the end of hostilities, the
authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.").
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52did not violate international law. The rationale for this provision is to
encourage reconciliation, which is of greater importance in noninternational
armed conflicts where patrolable international borders do not exist between
former enemies. Thus, the Commentary on the Protocol, prepared by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, states: "The object of this sub-
paragraph is to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to
reestablishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided. '53
The Geneva Conventions, then, would require prosecution of Saddam
Hussein for acts committed during the international armed conflicts involving
Iran, Kuwait, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They would not, however,
require prosecution of Charles Taylor, who is accused only of complicity in war
crimes during the internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone.
2. The Genocide Convention
Most of the countries of the world are party to the Genocide Convention,
which entered into force on January 12, 1952, and the International Court of
Justice has determined that the substantive provisions of the Convention
constitute customary international law binding on all states.54 Like the Geneva
Conventions, the Genocide Convention provides an absolute obligation to
prosecute persons responsible for genocide as defined in the Convention.55
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as one of the following acts
when committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:"
52. Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) 30 (S. Aft.).
53. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDrIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1402 (1987).
54. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (stating that the Convention's
principles are binding on states, "even without any conventional obligation").
55. Article IV of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or any
of the acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 45,
art. IV. Article V of the Genocide Convention requires states to "provide effective penalties"
for persons guilty of genocide. Id. art. V. Article VI of the Genocide Convention requires
prosecution by the state in whose territory genocide occurs or in an international court
established for this purpose. Id. art. VI. While Article VI suggests that only the territorial state
and state parties to an international criminal court have an obligation to prosecute the crime of
genocide, other states would still be bound to extradite an individual accused of genocide if they
are not able to prosecute. Therefore amnesty or exile/sanctuary for peace deals would be
manifestly inconsistent with the obligations of the Genocide Convention.
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(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
56
There are several important limitations inherent in this definition. First, to
constitute genocide, there must be proof that abuses were committed with the
specific intent required by the Genocide Convention. It is not enough that
abuses were intended to repress opposition; the intent must be literally to
destroy a group of people. Second, and even more importantly, the victims of
such abuses must constitute a group of one of the four specific types
enumerated in the Genocide Convention, namely, national, ethnic, racial, or
religious. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Genocide
Convention deliberately excluded acts directed against "political groups" from
the Convention's definition of genocide.57
The Genocide Convention would require prosecution of Saddam Hussein,
who has been accused of ordering attacks aimed at destroying the Northern
Iraqi Kurds and the Southern Iraqi Marsh Arabs as a people, resulting in
hundreds of thousands of casualties. Charles Taylor, in contrast, has not been
accused of acts of genocide.
3. The Torture Convention
The Torture Convention entered into force on June 26, 1987, and currently
has 138 parties. 58 The Convention defines "torture" as:
56. Genocide Convention, supra note 45, art. II; Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome-statute(e).pdf.
57. The exclusion of "political groups" was due in large part to the fact that the
Convention was negotiated during the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union and other
totalitarian governments feared that they would face interference in their internal affairs if
genocide were defined to include acts committed to destroy political groups. According to
Professor Kuper, "one may fairly say that the delegates, after all, represented governments in
power, and that many of these governments wished to retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress
political opposition." L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 30 (1982).
58. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of the
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any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
59
The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of
torture are offenses under its internal law 6° and to establish its jurisdiction over
such offenses in cases where the accused is found in its territory,6' and if such a
state does not extradite the alleged offender, the Convention requires it to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.6 2
Persons convicted of torture are to be subjected to harsh sentences
proportionate to the grave nature of the offense.63
The Special Court for Sierra Leone charged Charles Taylor with
committing crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone, including complicity in
widespread and systematic acts of torture, from 1991-1999. 64  Notably,
however, neither Sierra Leone (the state where the acts of torture occurred),
Liberia (the state of nationality of the accused), nor Nigeria (the state where
Charles Taylor was given asylum) were parties to the Torture Convention when
the acts of torture in Sierra Leone were committed.65 And although the United
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture, http://www.ohchr.orglenglish/law/cat-ratify.htm
(last visited Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Torture Convention Ratification Status].
59. Torture Convention, supra note 46, art. 1.
60. Id. art. 4. Article 4 also requires parties to criminalize acts which "constitute[]
complicity or participation in torture." Id.
61. Id. art. 5.
62. Id. art. 7.
63. According to the negotiating record of the Torture Convention, "[in applying article 4
[which requires states to make torture "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature," Torture Convention, supra note 46, art. 4], it seems reasonable to
require... that the punishment for torture should be close to the penalties applied to the most
serious offenses under the domestic legal system." J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 129 (1988).
64. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment, f 29-
31 (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-01 -I-001 .pdf.
65. The acts of torture alleged in the Special Court for Sierra Leone's indictment of
Charles Taylor occurred from 1991 to 1999. Sierra Leone ratified the Torture Convention on
Apr. 25,2001; Nigeria ratified the Convention on July28, 2001; Liberia ratified the Convention
on Sept. 22, 2004; and the United States ratified the Convention on Oct. 21, 1994. See Torture
Convention Ratification Status, supra note 58 (listing ratifying states).
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States, which helped broker the exile-for-peace deal, was a party to the Torture
Convention during that time, the requirements of the convention are not
applicable to the United States in this case because the acts of torture did not
occur in U.S. territory, the offender was not a national of the United States, and
the offender was not present in U.S. territory.66 Under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the provisions of a treaty "do not bind a party in relation
to any act or fact which took place ... before the date of the entry into force of
the treaty with respect to that party. "67 Consistent with the Vienna Convention
as well as the reasoning of the British High Court in the Pinochet case, the
obligations to prosecute and to refrain from taking actions which would
frustrate prosecution contained in the Torture Convention were not applicable
to the case of Charles Taylor because his alleged involvement in acts of torture
pre-dated the ratification of the Convention by the relevant states.68
Still, some might argue that the Torture Convention is relevant to the
situation involving Charles Taylor based on the Committee Against Torture's
1990 decision concerning the Argentinean amnesty laws. In that case, the
Committee Against Torture, which is the treaty body created by the Torture
Convention to facilitate its implementation, decided that communications
submitted by Argentinean citizens on behalf of their relatives who had been
tortured by Argentinean military authorities were inadmissible since Argentina
69had ratified the Convention only after the amnesty laws had been enacted.
However, in dictum, the Committee stated "even before the entry into force of
the Convention against Torture, there existed a general rule of international law
which should oblige all states to take effective measures to prevent torture and
to punish acts of torture. 
70
The Committee's statement should not be mistakenly construed as
suggesting that amnesties/asylum for persons who commit torture is invalid
66. See Torture Convention, supra note 46, art. 5 (setting forth conditions under which a
state must take action in response to Convention violations).
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, May 23, 1969, 112 Stat. 2681-822,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; cf. Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 24
(recognizing that the International Criminal Court has no retroactive jurisdiction and that
obligations under the Rome Statute do not apply to crimes committed prior to the ICC's entry
into force in July 2002).
68. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No.
3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 148-49 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (holding that head of state immunity
prevented prosecution or extradition of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet for acts that
predated the ratification of the Torture Convention by Chile, Spain, and the United Kingdom).
69. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Decision on Admissibility annex VI, at 109-13,
U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (June 21, 1990).
70. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Decision on Admissibility annex VI, at 109-13,
U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (June 21, 1990).
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under customary international law. By using the word "should," the Committee
indicated that its statement was aspirational rather than a declaration of binding
law. On the basis of its decision, the Committee urged Argentina to provide
remedies for the victims of torture and their surviving relatives; it did not
suggest that international law required that Argentina do so.7' Nor did it
specify that the remedy should be prosecution of those responsible, rather than
some other appropriate remedy such as compensation. The Committee's
decision, therefore, should not be read as indicating that the Torture
Convention required Nigeria, Liberia, or Sierra Leone to prosecute those whose
acts of torture pre-dated their ratification of the Convention.
4. General Human Rights Conventions
General human rights conventions include the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 72 and the similarly worded European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,73 and American
Convention on Human Rights.74 Although these treaties do not expressly
require states to prosecute violators, they do obligate states to "ensure" the
rights enumerated therein. There is growing recognition in the jurisprudence of
the treaty bodies responsible for monitoring enforcement of these conventions
and the writings of respected commentators that the duty to ensure rights
implies a duty to hold specific violators accountable.75
71. Idatill.
72. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The International Covenant currently has 154 parties,
including both Liberia and Nigeria. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations: International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2005).
73. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
74. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, adopted
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
75. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGrrs 114, 119 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (arguing that parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arguably must exercise due diligence to
prevent intentional deprivation of life by individuals, "as well as to apprehend murderers and to
prosecute them in order to deter future takings of life"); Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 2568
(arguing that states have a duty to bring torturers to justice); Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect
and To Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS 72,77 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) ("[The] obligation to 'ensure' rights creates affirmative
obligations on the state-for example, to discipline its officials.").
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Yet, a careful examination of the jurisprudence of these bodies suggests
that methods of obtaining specific accountability other than criminal
prosecutions would meet the requirement of "ensuring rights. 7 6  This
jurisprudence indicates that a state must fulfill five obligations in confronting
gross violations of human rights committed by a previous regime:
(1) investigate the identity, fate, and whereabouts of victims; (2) investigate
the identity of major perpetrators; (3) provide reparation or compensation to
victims; (4) take affirmative steps to ensure that human rights abuse does not
recur; and (5) punish those guilty of human rights abuse. Punishment can
take many noncriminal forms, including imposition of fines, removal from
office, reduction of rank, forfeiture of government or military pensions, and
exile.
B. Crimes Against Humanity
1. Definition
As developed in the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
codified in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 7 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,78 the Special
76. See Scharf, supra note 10, at 49-51 (criticizing conclusion that decisions of the Inter-
American Court and Commission establish criminal prosecution as the only permissible remedy
for violations of the American Convention); Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, Judgment IN 164, 194 (July 29, 1988) (reaching disposition of case without
ordering criminal prosecution); Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report.
No. 36/96, OEA/Ser.LIV/ll.95, doc. 7 rev. IN 57, 63,66,77 (1996) (finding that Chile's grant of
amnesty and failure to investigate related disappearances violated American Convention because
they foreclosed victims' families' rights to pursue their own criminal and civil remedies);
Orayece v. Chile, Case 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R, Report No. 25/98, OEA/ser.L/V/II.98,
doc. 6 rev. 11 60-71 (1998) (making similar findings regarding Chile's violation of duty to
investigate and to provide victims and families with judicial remedies); Espinoza v. Chile, Case
11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 133/99, OEA/Ser.LV/IH. 106, doc. 3 rev. 91 79-107
(2000) (making similar findings). For a summary of several relevant decisions of international
and regional human rights bodies, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution,
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, N 50-92, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (submitted
by Theo van Boyen), reprinted in 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 284, 303-24 (1996).
77. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, annex, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3, 1993).
78. S.C. Res. 955, annex art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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Court for Sierra Leone,79 and the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court,80 crimes against humanity are defined as:
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or





(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity;
(h) Persecutions against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health.8
States are required to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
and the crime of genocide, but there exists no treaty requiring prosecution of
79. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 2, http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
80. Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 7.
81. E.g., id.
359
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crimes against humanity (except for torture where the state is party to the
Torture Convention at the time the crime is committed); crimes against
humanity are purely a creature of customary international law.8z Traditionally,
those who committed crimes against humanity were treated like pirates, as
hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humankind), and any state, including
83their own, could punish them through its domestic courts. In the absence of a
treaty containing the aut dedere autjudicare (extradite or prosecute) principle,
this so called "universal jurisdiction" is generally thought to be permissive, not
mandatory. Yet several commentators and human rights groups have recently
taken the position that customary international law (and the notion of jus
cogens-meaning peremptory norms) not only establishes permissive
jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against humanity, but also requires their
prosecution and conversely prohibits the granting of amnesty or asylum to such
persons.8
4
2. Customary International Law
Notwithstanding the chimerical conclusions of some scholars, there is
scant evidence that a rule prohibiting amnesty or asylum in cases of crimes
against humanity has ripened into a compulsory norm of customary
international law. Customary international law, which is just as binding upon
states as treaty law, arises from "a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation" referred to as opiniojuris.85
Under traditional notions of customary international law, "deeds were what
counted, not just words., 8 6 Yet those who argue that customary international
82. The Charter of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was the first international
instrument in which crimes against humanity were codified. See Charter of the International
Military Tribunal annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, as amended by
Berlin Protocol of Oct. 6, 1945, reproduced in VmGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 2 THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 473-80 (1998).
83. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Sources in International Treaties of an Obligation to
Investigate, Prosecute and Provide Redress, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE 25 (N. Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
84. See supra note 8 (collecting sources).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1051, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments.htm
(providing that sources of international law applied by the court include "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
86. Bruno Simma, International Human Rights and General International Law: A
Comparative Analysis, in 4 (Book 2) COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW
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law precludes amnesty/exile for crimes against humanity base their position on
nonbinding General Assembly resolutions,8 7 hortative declarations of
international conferences,88 and international conventions that are not widely
ratified,89 rather than on any extensive state practice consistent with such a rule.
153,216 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXH), art. 4, U.N.
CAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (Dec. 1, 1967) (stating that the right to
asylum may not be invoked for crimes contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations); Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2712 (XXV), 3, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 15, 1970) (adopted 55-4 with thirty-three abstentions) (condemning
crimes against humanity and calling "upon the States concerned to bring to trial persons guilty
of such crimes"); Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), 4, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess.,
Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 18, 1971) (adopted 71-0 with forty-two abstentions)
(affirming that a state's refusal "to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment" of
persons accused or convicted of crimes against humanity is "contrary to the United Nations
Charter and to generally recognized norms of international law"); Principles of International
Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 1, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess.,
Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 3, 1973) (adopted 94-0 with twenty-nine abstentions)
(providing that crimes against humanity "shall be subject to investigation and the persons
against whom there is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing,
arrest, trials and, if found guilty, to punishment"); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133 pmbl., art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/49, at 207, 209
(Dec. 18, 1992) (equating disappearances to a crime against humanity and requiring states to try
any person suspected of having perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance); see also
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65 annex 18, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89, at 53 (May 24, 1989)
(resolving that states shall bring to justice those accused of having participated in extra-legal,
arbitrary, or summary executions). It is noteworthy that large numbers of countries abstained
during voting on the above listed resolutions, and thereby did not manifest their acceptance of
the principles enumerated therein.
88. The final Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights affirms that "[s]tates should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those
responsible for grave violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations,
thereby providing a firm basis for the rule of law." World Conference on Human Rights, June
14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 60, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/23
(June 25, 1993).
89. See, e.g., Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, art. l(b), done Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered
into force Nov. 11, 1970) (providing that no statutory limitation shall apply to crimes against
humanity, irrespective of the date of their commission). Only thirty-nine states have ratified the
Convention. Even if the Convention were more widely ratified, the prohibition on applying a
statute of limitations to crimes against humanity is not the equivalent of a duty to prosecute such
crimes.
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Commentators often cite the 1967 U.N. Declaration on Territorial
Asylum90 as the earliest international recognition of a legal obligation to
prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration provides
that "the right to seek and enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any person with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed
a... crime against humanity."9' Yet according to the historic record of this
resolution, "[t]he majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under
consideration was not intended to propound legal norms or to change existing
rules of international law, but to lay down broad humanitarian and moral
principles upon which States might rely in seeking to unify their practices
relating to asylum. 92  This evidences that, from the outset, the General
Assembly resolutions concerning the prosecution of crimes against humanity
were aspirational only, and not intended to create any binding duties.
In addition to this contrary legislative history, the trouble with an approach
to proving the existence of customary international law that focuses so heavily
on words is "that it is grown like a flower in a hot-house and that it is anything
but sure that such creatures will survive in the much rougher climate of actual
state practice." 93  Indeed, to the extent any state practice in this area is
widespread, it is the practice of granting amnesties or asylum to those who
commit crimes against humanity. 94 That the United Nations itself has felt free
of legal constraints in endorsing recent amnesty and exile-for-peace deals in
situations involving crimes against humanity suggests that customary
international law has not yet crystallized in this area. The Special Court for
Sierra Leone confirmed this when it recently held that domestic amnesties for
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in an internal armed
conflict were not unlawful under international law.
95
90. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), art. 1(2), U.N. GAOR,
Sess. 24, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (Dec. 14, 1967).
91. Id. at 81. Even if the Declaration were binding, the prohibition on granting asylum is
not the equivalent of a duty to prosecute, and informal sanctuary can be accorded without a
formal grant of asylum.
92. Declaration of Territorial Asylum, 1967 U.N.Y.B. 758,759, U.N. Sales No. E.68.I. 1.
93. Simma, supra note 86, at 217.
94. See Scharf, supra note 10, at 57-58 (citing numerous examples).
95. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kambara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-
16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty 7 (Mar. 13,
2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.orgfDocuments/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-I.pdf & http://www.
sc-sl.org/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-H.pdf (holding that there was no "general obligation for States to
refrain from amnesty laws on these crimes .... [and that] [clonsequently, if a State passes any
such law, it does not breach a customary rule" (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 315 (2003))).
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Commentators may point to the Secretary General's August 2004 Report
to the Security Council on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice as an
indication that the United Nations has recently altered its position on the
acceptability of amnesty/exile for peace deals. In that report, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations said that peace agreements and Security Council
resolutions and mandates should "[r]eject any endorsement. of amnesty for
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, including those relating to
ethnic, gender and sexually based international crimes, [and] ensure that no
such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United
Nations-created or -assisted court. "96 It is more significant, however, that in the
Security Council's debate on the Secretary-General's Report, there was no
consensus on this particularly controversial recommendation (only two of the
fifteen members of the Council-Brazil and Costa Rica-spoke in favor of it
while several opposed it), and the statement approved by the Council at the end
of the debate made no reference to the issue of amnesty. 
97
3. Jus Cogens
The concept ofjus cogens-meaning "peremptory norms"-is said to be
among the "most ambiguous and theoretically problematic of the doctrines of
international law."98 Since the inception of the modem state system three and a
half centuries ago, 99 international law has been based on notions of consent.
Under this concept ofjus dispositivium (positive law), states were bound only
to treaties to which they had acceded and to those rules of customary
international law to which they had acquiesced. The concept ofjus cogens, in
96. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies 64, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug.
23, 2004). See also U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5052 (Oct. 6,
2004), for the Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council.
97. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5052 (Oct. 6, 2004);
U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg., Resumption 1 at 26, 37-38, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5052
(Resumption 1) (Oct. 6, 2004).
98. Christopher A. Ford, Adjudicating Jus Cogens, 13 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145, 145 (1994);
see also Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2
(1990) (discussing the broad array of norms lumped under the heading jus cogens).
99. The state system, characterized as an association of sovereign states governed by
positive law rules to which they must consent before they are bound, is widely believed to have
originated with the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Stephane
Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy-Myth or Reality?, 2 J. HIST. INT'L L. 148, 148
(2000). For the full text of the Peace of Westphalia (Osnabruck and Munster) Treaties, in both
their Latin and English versions, see 1 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 119,270 (Clive Parry ed.,
1969).
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contrast, is based in part on natural law principles that "prevail over and
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in
conflict with them." °°
Though the term itself was not employed, thejus cogens concept was first
applied by the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which declared that the
treaty between Germany and Vichy France approving the use of French
prisoners of war in the German armaments industry was void under
international law as contra bonus mores (contrary to fundamental morals).''
The debates within the U.N. International Law Commission, which codified the
jus cogens concept in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
10 2
reflect the view that the phenomenon of Nazi Germany rendered the purely
contractual conception of international law insufficient for the modem era.1
0 3
Consequently, the International Law Commission opined that a treaty designed
to promote slavery or genocide, or to prepare for aggression, ought to be
declared void.'°4
Thus, pursuant to the jus cogens concept, states are prohibited from
committing crimes against humanity and an international agreement between
states to facilitate commission of such crimes would be void ab initio.
Moreover, there is growing recognition that universal jurisdiction exists such
that all states have a right to prosecute or entertain civil suits against the
perpetrators ofjus cogens crimes. °5 From this, some commentators take what
they view as the next logical step and argue that the concept also prohibits
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. k (1987).
101. United States v. Krupp, 9 TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NIERENBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COuNcIL LAW No. 10, at 1395 (1950).
102. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention, supra note 67, at 344.
103. Remarks of Antonio de Luna (Spain) in Summary Records of the 15th Session, 684th
Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 72, 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 & Addenda.
104. Id.
105. Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS. 67,88-90 (2001) ("It is now widely
accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction."); Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing that "[ilnternational law recognizes
'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses," including crimes against humanity and genocide).
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states from undertaking any action that would frustrate prosecution, such as
granting amnesty or asylum to those who have committed crimes against
humanity. 1
06
Such scholars fail, however, to take into consideration the fact that
although jus cogens has natural law underpinnings, the concept is also related
to customary law. A rule will qualify asjus cogens only if it is "accepted by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted." 107 Thusjus cogens norms have been described by one
court as "a select and narrow subset of the norms recognized as customary
international law."10 8 As with ordinary customary international lawjus cogens
norms are formed through widespread state practice and recognition," 9 but
unlike ordinary customary international law, a state cannot avoid application of
ajus cogens norm by being a persistent objector during its formation.
Though there is no question that the international community has accepted
that the prohibition against committing crimes against humanity qualifies as a
jus cogens norm," 10 this does not mean that the associated duty to prosecute has
106. See supra note 8 (collecting sources).
107. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, at 344.
108. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald,
J., dissenting) (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940
(D.C. Cir. 1988)).
109. As Judge Patricia Wald noted in Princz:
To ascertain customary international law, judges resort to "the customs and usages
of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators." These same tools are used to determine whether a norm of
customary international law has attained the special status of ajus cogens norm.
Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900)).
110. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The
universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg-rights against
genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts-are the direct ancestors of the universal and
fundamental norms recognized asjus cogens." (citation omitted)); Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582
(stating that "[i]ntemational law recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses,"
including crimes against humanity and genocide); Hirsh v. Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affid 133 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A foreign state violatesjus cogens when it
participates in such blatant violations of fundamental human rights as 'genocide, slavery,
murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination."' (quoting Comm. of
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) (distinguishing
between rights of protection that have entered into the body of general international law and
those that are conferred by international instruments); Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23
(May 28) ("The principles underlying the Convention are recognised by civilised nations as
binding on States even without any conventional obligation."); Theodor Meron,
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 558 (1995)
("The core prohibitions of crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide constitutejus
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simultaneously attained an equivalent status. In fact, all evidence is to the
contrary. Not only have there been numerous instances of states providing
amnesty and asylum to leaders accused of crimes against humanity, but, even
more telling, there have been no protests from states when such amnesty or
asylum has been offered. Moreover, there has been widespread judicial
recognition that the jus cogens nature of crimes against humanity does not
prevent accused perpetrators from successfully asserting head of state immunity
or sovereign immunity to avoid criminal or civil liability in foreign courts.11'
Because jus cogens, as a peremptory norm, would by definition supersede the
customary international law doctrine of head of state immunity where the two
come into conflict, the only way to reconcile these rulings is to conclude that
the duty to prosecute has not attained jus cogens status.
As compared to the substantive rule of law prohibiting states from entering
into international agreements that facilitate the commission of crimes against
humanity, the procedural obligation of third parties to prosecute such crimes
after their commission constitutes a far greater intrusion into a state's internal
sovereignty, with far less justification. Thus, it is sensible that such an
encroachment would require the state's consent through the carefully
negotiated provisions of a treaty-such as the Geneva Conventions, Genocide
Convention, or Torture Convention-which would narrowly define the
applicable circumstances and perhaps-like the Rome Statute-provide escape
clauses permitting states to disregard the obligation to prosecute when strict
enforcement would frustrate greater interests of international peace and justice.
C. Amnesty/Exile and the International Criminal Court
The above discussion indicates that there are frequently no international
legal constraints on the negotiation of an amnesty/exile-for-peace deal, and that
cogens norms.").
111. See Wei v. Jiang, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that violation ofjus
cogens is not an implied waiver of head of state immunity); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining whether sovereign immunity under U.S. law applies
tojus cogens violations); Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (allowing head of state immunity defense
for crimes committed prior to ratification of Torture Convention); Case Concerning the Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 21-22 (Feb. 14), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htn (denying exception to head of
state immunity for war crimes); AI-Adsani v. United Kingdom, No. 35763/97, § 61, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2001) (affirming state immunity from international civil suits).
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in certain circumstances swapping amnesty/exile for peace can serve the
interests of both peace and justice. However, an international criminal tribunal
is not bound to defer to a domestic amnesty/exile arrangement.' 12 During the
negotiations for the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court
(ICC), the United States and a few other delegations expressed concern that the
ICC would hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and restore peace and
democracy in places like Haiti and South Africa.' "
3
According to the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, Philippe
Kirsch of Canada, the issue was not definitively resolved during the Diplomatic
Conference. Rather, the provisions that were adopted reflect "creative
ambiguity" that could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of the ICC to
interpret the Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty or asylum
exception to the jurisdiction of the court."
4
1. The Preamble
The preamble to the Rome Statute suggests that deferring a prosecution
because of the existence of a national amnesty or asylum deal would be
incompatible with the purpose of the court, namely to ensure criminal
prosecution of persons who commit serious international crimes. In particular,
the Preamble:
112. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) recently held that the Lom6 Accord,
which granted amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes committed during the conflict in Sierra
Leone, could not deprive the SCSL of jurisdiction because the SCSL was an international court
with jurisdiction over international crimes. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Karnbara, Case Nos. SCSL-
2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6
Accord Amnesty IJ87-89 (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
Documents/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-I.pdf & http://www.sc-sl.org/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-II.pdf.
113. See U.S. Delegation Draft: State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons 1 (Aug.
17, 1997), http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/documentsreportsprepcmt 4 .html ("The U.S.
delegation has raised the difficult matter of how to address amnesties and pardons in the context
of a statute for an international criminal court.").
114. The author discussed this issue with Philippe Kirsch over dinner during an
international conference in Strasbourg, France, on November 19, 1998. Michael P. Scharf, The
Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 507, 522 n.104 (1999). U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated that it would be
"inconceivable" for the ICC to undermine an amnesty-for-peace arrangement by pursuing
prosecution in a situation like South Africa. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the U.N., Speech
at the Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony (Sept. 1, 1998), quoted in Darryl
Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International
Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 482 n.5 (2003).
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Affirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured...
Recall[s] that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes...
[And] Emphasiz[es] that the International Criminal Court established under
this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.115
Preambular language is important because international law provides that
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose."' 1 6 Thus, the Rome Statute's preamble constitutes a
critical source of interpretation because it indicates both the treaty's context and
its object and purpose. Yet, notwithstanding this preambular language, there
are several articles of the Rome Statute (discussed below) that might be read as
permitting the court under certain circumstances to recognize an amnesty
exception to its jurisdiction. The apparent conflict between these articles and
the preamble reflects the schizophrenic nature of the negotiations at Rome:
The preambular language and the procedural provisions were negotiated by
entirely different drafting groups, and in the rush of the closing days of the
Rome Conference, the drafting committee never fully integrated and reconciled
the separate portions of the Statute.
2. Article 16: Action by the Security Council
With respect to a potential amnesty/asylum exception, the most important
provision of the Rome Statute is Article 16. Under that article, the ICC would
be required to defer to a national amnesty if the Security Council adopts a
resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter requesting the court
not to commence an investigation or prosecution, or to defer any proceedings
already in progress." 7 The Security Council recently invoked its right under
115. Rome Statute, supra note 56, pmbl.
116. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, at 340.
117. Article 16 of the Rome Statute, titled, "Deferral of investigation or prosecution,"
states:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
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Article 16 of the Rome Statute in adopting Resolution 1593, referring the
Darfur atrocities to the ICC for prosecution but at the same time providing that
the ICC could not exercise jurisdiction over foreign military personnel in
Darfur who are from states (other than Sudan) that are not parties to the Rome
Statute.' 18
The Security Council has the legal authority to require the court to respect
an amnesty or asylum if two requirements are met, namely: (1) the Security
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter;119 and
(2) the resolution requesting the court's deferral is consistent with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations with respect to maintaining international
peace and security, resolving threatening situations in conformity with
principles of justice and international law, and promoting respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter.
120
The decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the
Tadic case suggests that the ICC could assert that it has the authority to
independently assess whether these two requirements were met as part of its
incidental power to determine the propriety of its own jurisdiction (competence
de la competence).1 21 One commentator has characterized this aspect of the
Appeals Chamber decision as "strongly support[ing] those who see the U.N.
Charter not as unblinkered license for police action but as an emerging
constitution of enumerated, limited powers subject to the rule of law." 122 It is
possible, then, that the ICC would not necessarily be compelled by the
existence of a Security Council resolution to terminate an investigation or
prosecution were it to find that an amnesty contravenes international law.
While an amnesty or exile arrangement accompanied by the establishment
of a truth commission, victim compensation, and lustration might be in the
interests of justice in the broad sense, it would nonetheless be in contravention
of international law where the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Genocide Convention, or the Torture Convention are
applicable. It is especially noteworthy that the Geneva Conventions require
Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 16.
118. S.C. Res. 1593, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm.
119. U.N. Charter art. 39.
120. U.N. Charter art. 24, paras. 1-2.
121. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 16 (Oct. 2, 1995).
122. Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 245, 249
(1996).
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parties "to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention,' '123 that the Genocide Convention requires parties "to provide
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide,"'24 and that the Torture
Convention requires parties to make torture "punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature.
'1 25
This would suggest that the ICC might not defer to the Security Council
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute where the accused is charged with grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide, or torture.
Yet, a strong counterargument can be made that the Rome Statute codifies only
the substantive provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Genocide
Convention, and the Torture Convention, and does not incorporate those
procedural aspects of the Conventions that require prosecution (which apply to
the state parties but not to the ICC, which has its own international legal
personality). Accordingly, the nature of the charges might constitute a factor to
be considered but would not necessarily be a bar to deferring to an amnesty or
exile arrangement.
3. Article 53: Prosecutorial Discretion
Where the Security Council has not requested the ICC to respect an
amnesty or exile-for-peace deal and thereby to terminate a prosecution, the
court's prosecutor may choose to do so under Article 53 of the Rome Statute. 
126
That article permits the prosecutor to decline to initiate an investigation (even
when a state party has filed a complaint) where the prosecutor concludes there
123. Geneva Convention I, supra note 44, art. 49.
124. Genocide Convention, supra note 45, art. V.
125. Torture Convention, supra note 46, art. 4.
126. Article 53 of the Rome Statute titled, "Initiation of an Investigation," provides in
relevant part:
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable
basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation,
the Prosecutor shall consider whether:...
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims,
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would
not serve the interests of justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or
her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform
the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 53.
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are "substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests ofjustice."127 However, the decision of the prosecutor under Article
53 is subject to review by the pretrial chamber of the court. In reviewing
whether respecting an amnesty or exile deal and not prosecuting would better
serve "the interests of justice," the pretrial chamber would have to evaluate the
benefits of a particular amnesty or exile arrangement and consider whether
there is an international legal obligation to prosecute the offense (as discussed
above).
4. Article 17: Complementarity
Where neither the Security Council nor the prosecutor has requested the
ICC to defer to a national amnesty, the concerned state can attempt to raise the
issue under Article 17(l)(a) of the Rome Statute. That article requires the court
to dismiss a case where "[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."128 It is significant that
the article requires an investigation but does not specify that it be a criminal
investigation. The concerned state could argue that a truth commission
(especially one modeled on that of South Africa) constitutes a genuine
investigation. On the other hand, subsection (2) of Article 17 suggests that the
127. Id. Darryl Robinson, who served on Canada's delegation to the ICC Preparatory
Committee from 1997-2002 and is currently a legal adviser to the ICC Prosecutor, has proposed
the following criteria for determining whether deferring to an amnesty or exile arrangement
would be "in the interests of justice":
* Was the measure adopted by democratic will?
* Is the departure from the standard of criminal prosecution of all offenders
based on necessity, i.e. [sic] irresistible social, economic or political
realities?
* Is there a full and effective investigation into the facts?
* Does the fact-finding inquiry 'name names'?
* Is the relevant commission or body independent and suitably resourced?
* Is there at least some form of punishment of perpetrators (are they
identified, required to come forward, required to do community service,
subject to lustration)?
* Is some form of remedy or compensation provided to victims?
* Does the national approach provide or sense of closure or justice to
victims?
* Is there a commitment to comply with other human rights obligations?
Robinson, supra note 114, at 497-98.
128. Id. art. 17(1)(a).
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standard for determining that an investigation is not genuine is whether the
proceedings are "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice" 129-a phrase that might be interpreted as requiring criminal
proceedings.
In sum, the Rome Statute is purposely ambiguous on the question of
whether the ICC should defer to an amnesty/exile-for-peace arrangement in
deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction. While amnesties and exiles are
sometimes a necessary bargaining chip in negotiations for the peaceful transfer
of political power, it must be recognized that such arrangements can vary
greatly. Some, as in South Africa and Haiti, are closely linked to mechanisms
for providing accountability and redress; others, as in the case of the exile of
Charles Taylor, are simply a mindful forgetting. The ICC should take only the
former types of amnesties/exiles into account in prosecutorial decisions.
Moreover, the ICC should be particularly reluctant to defer to an amnesty/exile
in situations involving violations of international conventions that create
obligations to prosecute, such as the Genocide Convention and the grave
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The other international
agreements and customary international law crimes that make up the ICC's
subject matter jurisdiction make prosecution for related crimes possible, but not
mandatory, and should be treated as such by the court in the broader interests of
peace and international security.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has described how, under the present state of international
law, the international procedural law imposing a duty to prosecute is far more
limited than the substantive law establishing international offenses. 130 The
129. Id. art. 17(2)(b). Compare Bruce Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: A
Checklist for National Implementation, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION 144 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999) ("It is also conceivable that an amnesty
granted in the context of a 'truth commission' process could be considered an 'investigation'
followed by a bona fide decision not to proceed for the purposes of Article 17(l)(b)."), quoted
in Robinson, supra note 114, at 499 n.78, with John Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity,
in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 77 (R.S. Lee ed.,
1999) ("It is clear that the Statute's provisions on complementarity are intended to refer to
criminal investigations.... A truth commission and the amnesties it provides may not meet the
test of a criminal investigation .... "), quoted in Robinson, supra note 114, at 499 n.8 1.
130. Cf. Ratner, supra note 10, at 714 (characterizing the procedural requirement to
prosecute as "accountability norms" and the substantive law establishing offenses as "liability
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reason for this is historical: With respect to all but the most notorious of
international crimes, it was easier for states to agree to recognize permissive
jurisdiction than to undertake a duty to prosecute. But where the duty to
prosecute does apply, it is critical that states and international organizations
honor it, lest they express contempt for the important treaties from which the
duty arises, potentially putting their own citizens at risk pursuant to the
international law principle of reciprocity.
This is not to suggest, however, that states must rush to prosecute all
persons involved in offenses under these treaties. Selective prosecution and use
of "exemplary trials" is acceptable as long as the criteria used reflect
appropriate distinctions based upon degrees of culpability and sufficiency of
evidence. 31  Moreover, while the provisions of the treaties requiring
prosecution are nonderogable even in time of public emergency that threatens
the life of the nation, the doctrine of force majeure can warrant temporary
postponement of prosecutions for a reasonable amount of time until a new
government is secure enough to take such action against members of the former
regime or until a new government has the judicial resources to undertake fair
and effective prosecutions.'
32
In the case of Saddam Hussein, the United States had accused the Iraqi
leader of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the
Genocide Convention. Both the United States and Iraq were parties to these
treaties, which contain an absolute obligation to prosecute offenders. By
offering to permit exile and perpetual sanctuary in Bahrain in lieu of invasion
and prosecution, the Bush administration signaled that the provisions of these
treaties are inconsequential, thereby undermining the rule of law in a critical
area of global affairs. This must be viewed also in light of other U.S. actions
involving application of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in Iraq, most
notably the infamous White House memos authored by now Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales. The memos refer to the Geneva Conventions as "obsolete"
and "quaint,"'' 33 and wrongly opine that the Torture Convention permits mild
norms"); Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice's Decision in Congo v.
Belgium: How Has It Affected the Development of a Principle of Universal Jurisdiction that
Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63, 95 (2003)
(characterizing the procedural requirement to prosecute as "obligatory universal jurisdiction,"
and distinguishing it from "voluntary universal jurisdiction").
131. Michael P. Scharf & Nigel Rodley, International Law Principles on Accountability, in
POST-CONFLicr JUSTICE 89, 95 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
132. Id. at 96.
133. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to President
George W. Bush, at 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/
etn/gov-rep/gov-memointlaw.htm. In a dissenting memo, Secretary of State Colin Powell
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forms of torture,1 34 thereby creating a climate of disdain toward international
humanitarian law and opening the door to the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Admiral
John Hutson, Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Navy from 1997-2000,
urged the Bush administration to officially and unequivocally repudiate
Gonzales's erroneous position. In doing so, Hutson stressed that:
Since World War II and looking into the foreseeable future, United States
armed forces are more forward-deployed both in terms of numbers of
deployments and numbers of troops than all other nations combined. What
this means in practical terms is that adherence to the Geneva Conventions is
more important to us than to any other nation. We should be the nation
demanding adherence under any and all circumstances because we will
benefit the most. 1
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Because Hussein did not accept the exile-for-peace offer, the damage to
the rule of law in this instance was negligible. Would greater damage to the
rule of law have nevertheless been acceptable if it succeeded in averting a war
which has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties on both sides since 2003?
This Article has described the policy reasons generally favoring prosecution,
including the fact that former leaders who have resorted to war crimes and
crimes against humanity tend to be recidivists. Saddam Hussein himself
launched a coup and initiated his policy of terror after he was released from
prison through a domestic amnesty in 1968. It is not hard to imagine the
dangers Hussein could present to the Iraqi democratic transition from exile in
nearby Bahrain. Moreover, the people of Iraq have insisted on Hussein's trial
before the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 136 Morally, what right would American
negotiators have to trade away the ability of thousands of Hussein's victims to
see the dictator brought tojustice? Finally, it is worth stressing that the duty to
argued that Mr. Gonzales's position "reverse[s] over a century of U.S. policy and practice in
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine[s] the protections of the law of war for our
troops, both in this specific conflict and in general." Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U.S.
Secretary of State, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and Condoleezza Rice,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at 2 (Jan. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.orglus-law/etnlgov-rep/gov-memointlaw.htm.
134. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/etn/gov-rep/govmemo_intlaw.htm.
135. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney
General of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 507
(2005) (testimony of John D. Hutson, Dean and President of Franklin Pierce Law Center).
136. See Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair Trial?, supra note 1 (noting that Iraqis "insisted,
over initial U.S. objections, on the inclusion of a provision ... that enables the [Iraqi Special
Tribunal] to prosecute Hussein for the crime of aggression").
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prosecute Hussein arising from these treaties did not require or even justify the
invasion of Iraq. Rather, it merely prohibited actions that are manifestly
incompatible with the prosecution of Hussein, such as arranging for exile and
sanctuary in Bahrain.
The situation involving Charles Taylor is distinguishable. Taylor has been
charged by the Special Court for Sierra Leone with complicity in crimes against
humanity and war crimes in an internal armed conflict. As the Special Court
itself has recognized, since there is no treaty-based nor customary international
law duty to prosecute crimes against humanity or war crimes in an internal
conflict, an amnesty or exile-for-peace deal would not constitute a violation of
international law. 1
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The distinction reflects the fact that, notwithstanding the natural law
rhetoric ofjus cogens employed by proponents of a broad duty to prosecute, the
international legal order is still governed by principles of positive law under the
357-year-old Westphalian concept of sovereignty. 38 State practice belies the
existence of a customary international law duty (based on the positive law
notion of state acquiescence to rules over time) to prosecute outside of the
treaty framework. Consequently, the obligation to prosecute and the
corresponding duty to refrain from frustrating prosecution through amnesty or
exile applies only to certain treaty-based crimes where the treaty sets forth such
an obligation and the affected states are party to the treaty at the time of the acts
in question. This conclusion is analogous to that of the House of Lords in the
Pinochet case, in which the British High Court held that the head of state
immunity doctrine prevented the United Kingdom from extraditing to Spain
former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet for crimes against humanity, with
the exception of crimes of torture committed after the U.K., Chile, and Spain
had all ratified the Torture Convention. 139 Thus, while there was a treaty-based
duty to prosecute Saddam Hussein under the Geneva Conventions and
Genocide Convention, no such duty existed in the case of Charles Taylor, who
was accused of crimes against humanity.
This does not mean that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has to honor
the Charles Taylor exile-for-peace deal. The Special Court made clear that
amnesty and exile arrangements are only binding within the state(s) granting
them. They do not apply to other states or to international tribunals such as the
Special Court. Moreover, it is important to recognize that amnesty, exile, and
137. Supra note 95 and accompanying text.
138. See Beaulac, supra note 99, at 148 (describing the origins of the state system in the
Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648).
139. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3),
[2000] 1 A.C. 147, 148-49 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.).
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sanctuary arrangements are often temporary in nature. They are not a
permanent right of the recipient, but a privilege bestowed by the territorial state,
which can be revoked by a subsequent government or administration. The
trend in recent years is to use amnesty and exile as a transitional step toward
eventual justice, not as an enduring bar to justice.140 As a U.S. Department of
State official explained with respect to Charles Taylor, "First we'll get him out
of Liberia, then we'll get him to the Court.'
41
140. Peter A. Barcroft, The Slow Demise of Impunity in Argentina and Chile, (Jan. 2005),
http:lwww.asil.orglinsights/2005/1OlinsightO5OlO7.htm (reporting that Chile has revoked
Pinochet's immunity and initiated criminal proceedings against him) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. Lizza, supra note 6, at 10. The European Parliament is currently pushing for the
adoption of a U.N. Security Council Resolution that would require Nigeria to surrender Taylor
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone for prosecution. Bruce Zagaris, European Parliament
Passes Resolution Calling for Action to Ensure Taylor's Court Appearance, 21 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 200, 200 (2005). On November 11, 2005, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1638, which expanded the mandate of the U.N. force in
Liberia to include apprehending Charles Taylor in the event that he returns to Liberia and to
transfer him to the Special Court for Sierra Leone for prosecution. Although the resolution did
not require Nigeria to revoke Taylor's asylum, it did pointedly refer to Taylor's asylum as a
"temporary stay" in Nigeria. S.C. Res. 1638, pmbl., 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1638 (Nov. 11,
2005).
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